11/18/15

Saudis Planning For A War Of Attrition In Europe With Russia’s Oil Industry

Russia’s central bank recently warned about the growing financial risks to the Russian economy from Saudi Arabia encroaching upon its traditional export market for crude oil. Russia sends 70 percent of its oil to Europe, but Saudi Arabia has been making inroads in the European market amid the oil price downturn.

The result is a heavier discount for Russia’s crude oil, the so-called Urals blend. Bloomberg reported that the Urals typically lands in Rotterdam, a major European destination, at a discount to Brent of around $2 or less. But the discount has widened to $3.50 lately due to increased competition from Saudi Arabia. “Oil supplies to Europe from Saudi Arabia are probably adversely affecting Urals prices,” the Russian central bank warned in a recent report.

Russian officials have accused Saudi Arabia of “dumping” its oil in Europe, a move that Rosneft chief Igor Sechin said would “backfire.”

Russia’s economy has been battered by the collapse in crude prices, compounded by the screws of western sanctions. The Russian economy could shrink by 3.2 percent this year.

Oil exports account for around half of the revenue taken in by the Russian government. And for an economy so dependent on oil, it is no surprise that the plummeting crude oil price has led to a dramatic depreciation of the ruble, although over the past month the currency regained some lost ground. The weakening currency has pushed up inflation, which creates a conundrum for the Russian central bank.

To stop the ruble from plunging further and to keep inflation from spiraling ever upwards, the Russian central bank took aggressive action by hiking interest rates to as high as 17 percent at the beginning of 2015. However, that has negatively impacted the economy. As the ruble stabilized, the bank dialed the interest rate back to 11 percent, where it stands today.

In response to the tough financial circumstances that Russia has found itself in, it sees no choice but to squeeze as much oil out of its aging fields as it can. So far, it has succeeded to some extent. Russian oil production is expected to rise by a modest 70,000 barrels per day in 2015, averaging 10.75 million barrels per day (mb/d) over the course of this year. Output hit a post-Soviet record of 10.78 mb/d in October, according to OPEC’s latest monthly report.

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However, the upside to Russia’s oil production is limited. The Russian government needs revenue, so is not keen to cut taxes. The government is mulling a delay in the planned cut in export taxes, which, according to OPEC, could result in oil companies paying an additional $2 to $3 billion more in taxes. That could modestly cut into overall Russian oil production, perhaps pushing output down by 0.1 to 0.2 mb/d. In any case, Russia probably can’t boost output any further. OPEC predicts Russia’s oil production will remain flat through next year.

Globally, the competition between oil exporters won’t ease in the near term. There are still too many barrels of crude floating around. OPEC predicts that non-OPEC supply will contract by just 0.13 mb/d in 2016, a rather trivial amount considering the extreme cut backs in investment and drilling activity.

Despite the fact that OPEC officials have consistently put on a brave face in public, insisting that markets will balance relatively quickly, OPEC’s numbers tell a different story. The cartel sees U.S. shale contracting by just 100,000 barrels per day in 2016 from 2015, a volume that is nearly offset by several new projects beginning operations in the Gulf of Mexico.

Which brings us back to Europe. Saudi Arabia could be playing a longer game, intensifying its market share strategy by encroaching on Russia’s traditional market in Europe. An increase in Saudi oil flowing to Europe threatens to undermine Russia’s principle market. In its November report, OPEC reported that the Urals discount to Brent “almost tripled in October amid plentiful supplies, sagging refinery margins and wide availability of alternative grades from the Middle East.”

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Saudis-Planning-For-A-War-Of-Attrition-In-Europe-With-Russias-Oil-Industry.html

By Nick Cunningham of Oilprice.com

10/19/15

Oil Market Showdown: Can Russia Outlast The Saudis?

“Two men enter, one man leaves, two men enter, one man leaves, two men enter…”

Mad Max: Beyond Thunderdome

November 27, oil consuming countries will celebrate the first anniversary of the Saudi decision to let market forces determine prices. This decision set crude prices on a downward path. Subsequently, to defend market share, the Saudis increased production, which exacerbated market oversupply and further pressured prices.

While the sharp decline in crude prices has saved crude consuming nations hundreds of billions of dollars, the loss in revenues has caused crude exporting countries intense economic and financial pain. Their suffering has led some to call for a change in strategy to “balance” the market and boost prices. Venezuela, an OPEC member, has even proposed an emergency summit meeting.

In practice, the call for a change is a call for Saudi Arabia and Russia, the two dominant global crude exporters, which each daily export over seven-plus mmbbls (including condensates and NGLs) and which each see the other as the key to any “balancing” moves, to bear the brunt of any production cuts.

Both, it would seem, have incentive to do so, as each has lost over $100 billion in crude revenues in 2015—and Russia bears the extra burden of U.S. and EU Ukraine-related economic and financial sanctions. Yet, while both publicly profess willingness to discuss market conditions, neither has shown any real inclination to reduce output—in fact, both countries seem committed to keeping their feet pressed to their crude output pedals. In the course of 2015, both have raised output and exports over 2014 levels—Saudi Arabia by ~500 and 550~ mbbls/day respectively and Russia by ~100 and ~150. The Saudis have repeatedly cut pricing to undercut competitors to maintain market share in the critical U.S. and China markets, while the Russian Finance Ministry recently backed away from a tax proposal which Russian crude producers said would reduce their output.

This apparent bravado notwithstanding, the two countries’ entry into the low-price Crudedome is ravaging their economies. Should crude prices decline from current levels, or even just stagnate, it is possible neither country will exit the CrudeDomeunder its own power.

IMF WEO Data: Recessions as far as the Eyes can See

Both Saudi Arabia and Russia paint positive portraits on current and future economic performance. At a conference in Moscow on October 14, President Putin said that Russia had reached if not passed the peak of its economic crisis and predicted economic growth in coming years. Arab News announced in the first paragraph of its report on Q2 Saudi economic performance that Q2 GDP grew 3.79 percent year-over-year, up from 2.3 percent growth in Q1.

Yet IMF October 2015 and April 2015 World Economic Outlook projections for the Russian and Saudi economies a paint pessimistic portrait, as the following three tables, forecasting GDP through 2020 in current prices/national currency, constant prices/national currency, and current prices/US$ show (all data in billions).

– In each of the data series, except the April and October ones, Russian current prices/national currency and the Saudi constant prices/national currency series, GDP declines from 2014 to 2015. (When adjusted for estimated inflation, however, the forecasts for Russian GDP current prices/national currency show GDP declining from 2014 levels—to 64,039 billion Rubles given inflation of 17.943 percent in the April series; in the October series, to 64,463 billion rubles, given inflation of 15.789 percent. The growth shown in the Saudi constant prices/national currency series results from the reduction in the deflator, which the Saudi National Statistical Office, Central Department of Statistics and Information uses to convert current national currency GDP into constant national currency. For example, decreasing the deflator from 115.073 to 94.234 in the October series and to 97.066 from 115.889 in the April series turns a decrease in GDP in current prices into an increase in GDP in constant prices).

– Between the April and the October forecasts in most of the data series, GDP deteriorates (blue font). Crude prices bear much of the responsibility: the April forecasts were based on $58.14 and $65.65 per barrel oil in 2015 and 2016 respectively, while the October projections are based $51.62 and $50.36 respectively.

– The year in which GDP exceeds 2014 GDP is noted in red font. As a result of the deterioration in GDP forecasts between April and October in the Saudi current prices/national currency series, GDP does not exceed 2014 GDP until 2018 instead of 2017; in the Russian current prices, US$ series, GDP exceeds 2014 level after 2020 instead of 2019; in the Saudi current prices/US$, the recovery is pushed to 2018 from 2017. (In inflation adjusted terms, Russian GDP in current prices, national currency would be below 2015 levels in 2020).

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In Russia, the impact of low crude revenues on GDP has raised questions about Russia’s long term economic prospects. Some see Russia’s economic growth potential as 1 percent annually or less due to low energy prices, low productivity levels, and a shrinking population, while Alexei Kudrin, finance minister from 2001 to 2011, recently commented that Russia’s growth model for the last fifteen years—using income from energy exports to drive up wages, domestic demand and therefore growth—will no longer work. With the government strapped for funds, and energy income no longer supporting domestic demand, some see investment as the sole possible driver of growth.

IMF WEO Data: Budget Deficits as far as the Eyes can See

Both the Saudi and Russian governments depend on energy revenues to fund their budgets—oil funds ~90 percent of the Saudi budget and oil and natural gas ~52 percent of the Russian budget. With the decline in prices, the Saudi budget anticipates a deficit of 20 percent of GDP in 2015 and the Russian budget a deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP. The April and October WEO budget projections in national currencies (Rubles and Riyals) show the deficits decreasing, but continuing through 2020 for both countries:

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The following table shows that as a percentage of GDP, the deficits decline steadily through 2020. However, as a percentage of GDP, the WEO October projections show the Saudi deficits remain double-digit through 2020—the potential impact of which will be discussed in the section on currencies.

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As planning for the 2016 fiscal year proceeds, fiscal reality is forcing both governments to scramble for new sources of revenues and/or opportunities to cut spending to reduce their budget deficits. The Russian government suspended the budget rule using a long term average of crude prices to set spending, since the resulting $80 average price would have dictated unreasonable spending in 2016.

President Putin ordered a 10 percent cut in Interior Ministry personnel, imposed a one million headcount ceiling on this ministry, and planned cuts in Kremlin headcount. The Finance Ministry sought a change in the mineral extraction tax formula to generate an additional 609 billion rubles in 2015 and 1.6 trillion through 2018, but pressure from the Economic and Energy Ministries and Russian producers forced the Finance Ministry to consider alternatives with less negative impact on crude production. In addition, the government reportedly is taking some $13 billion from national pension funds, while the Russian Central Bank is preparing proposals on government pension guarantees that would shift some pension funding burden from the government budget to companies and individuals.

The Saudi government is also scrambling. After an eight year hiatus from issuing sovereign debt, the Saudi government announced a plan during the summer to borrow $28 billion in 2015 and launched the borrowing with a $5 billion offering in August. The Ministry of Finance has banned contracts for new projects, hiring and promotions, and purchase of vehicles or furniture in the fourth quarter, while the newly created Council for Economic and Development Affairs must now approve all government projects worth more than $27 million. The Saudi government also is preparing to privatize airports and contemplating seeking private financing for infrastructure projects.

The budget situation puts the Saudi government in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the size of the deficits requires drastic cuts in spending, but such drastic cuts would impact politically sensitive areas such as energy subsidies, government employment opportunities for Saudi citizens, education, and economic development projects. On the other hand, depleting Saudi government reserves to finance the deficits will put the Saudi sovereign credit rating at risk, which would raise the cost of borrowing as well as pressure the Saudi currency (the consequences of which are discussed below).

IMF WEO Data: Lagging Per Capita Income as far as the Eyes can See

In both Russia and Saudi Arabia, the governments have attempted to shield their citizens from job cuts. In Russia, the government has discouraged businesses from shedding employees, while the Saudi government has maintained headcount in the government and government-related bodies, where most Saudis nationals are employed.

In terms of income, however, the situation is different. IMF WEO projections show per capita income in 2015 declining from 2014 levels in both Russia and Saudi Arabia, and only slowly recovering (the year exceeding 2014 levels in red font). (The increases in per capita income in the Russia current prices, national currency and in the Saudi constant prices, national currency series results from the same factors discussed in the section on GDP).

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Impact on Currencies

The steep decline in crude prices has pressured both currencies. The Ruble has suffered two curses. First, it has declined substantially relative to “hard” currencies, such as the US$, the Euro, British Pound, and the Swiss Franc. Against the U.S. dollar, it depreciated ~29 percent from November 27, 2014 to October 13, 2015 (48.58/US$, to 62.77). Second, it has been and continues to be highly volatile, its fate tied to moves in crude prices. The Ruble reached its post-November 27 low on June 27 (33.73/US$) and twice reached its high of ~70/US$ (January 30 69.47, August 24 70.89). A chart is available on Bloomberg.

The pressure on the Ruble forced the Russian Central Bank to take a series of emergency measures. At the end of last year, it spent ~$100 billion from its foreign currency reserves to defend the Ruble (it finally abandoned the defense when it proved futile and allowed the Ruble to float). In the same period, it extended emergency “hard” currency funding to major Russian banks and businesses with “hard” currency obligations that were coming due at the end of 2014. The Central Bank also sharply raised interest rates—to 17 percent at one point—and has kept the rates high to defend the Ruble (currently ~11 percent). Two examples illustrate the impact of Ruble devaluation:

– Transaero, until recently Russia’s second largest passenger airline, attributed being forced into bankruptcy to high interest rates and a devalued Ruble—the former raised the cost of financing, the latter pushed up prices in Rubles and therefore reduced demand in Russia for international flights and increased the cost, in Rubles, of repaying foreign currency denominated loans and interest.

– The Association of European Businesses in Russia recently announced that sales of new cars and light commercial vehicles contracted 29 percent in August year-over-year and forecast a 37 percent decline for all of 2015. It cited price increases that the car manufactures were forced to take to cover the increased cost of foreign parts and systems used in domestic auto manufacturing.

Volatility is equally pernicious. As another Bloomberg article points out, Russian businesses, unsure of what the value of the Ruble will be long term or even day-to-day, are deferring investment despite generating substantial (Ruble) profits—the very investment which some believe the Russian economy needs to grow and which has been contracting for 20 months.

The Saudis have avoided both Riyal depreciation and volatility. The government has insisted it will keep the Riyal pegged at 3.75/US$ and financial markets thus far have taken comfort from Saudi reserves (estimated to exceed $660 billion). However, as deficits deplete reserves and events occur that threaten the peg and Saudi oil-related export revenues, this comfort quickly could dissipate. After the Chinese Central Bank unexpectedly devalued the Yuan by ~2 percent against the US$, bets that the Saudis would be forced to abandon the peg spiked.

Breaking the peg would devastate the Saudi economy. It would drive up the cost of imports—and Saudi Arabia depends substantially on imports for a wide variety and high percentage of necessary consumer, business, and government goods and services—from food to oil, petrochemical, and other industrial equipment and services to military equipment, supplies, and training. It would also harm the Saudis who recently have been increasing their exposure to “hard” currency denominated loans.

Sovereign Wealth and Foreign Currency Reserves

Both the Saudis and the Russians are drawing down reserves they accumulated during the $100-plus/barrel crude price era to finance their spending. Over the nine months to July 2015, Saudi reserves declined $76 billion, from $737 billion to $661 billion, implying an annual rate of $100 to $130 billion. Should large withdrawals continue, or the amounts increase, confidence in the Riyal will sink.

Besides the $100 billion the Central Bank spent defending the Ruble, the Russian government has used funds from its sovereign wealth funds (the National Welfare Fund and the Reserve Fund) to reduce to fund priority projects, particularly in the energy industry—Rosneft sought one of the largest amounts. In June, Stratfor put the draw on the sovereign wealth funds at $44 billion.

China: The Sword of Damocles

In an era of low crude prices, modest economic growth, and modest crude demand growth, both Saudi Arabia and Russia (and other crude exporters) look to China as a source of incremental revenue to make up for the massive absolute declines in revenue and are prepared to compete intensely for market share.

One can imagine, then, the panic in Riyadh and Moscow when they contemplated the implications of the Chinese Central Bank’s decision to devalue the Yuan by ~2 percent against the U.S. dollar and the possibility this was the first salvo in a series of devaluations.

– For the Saudis, devaluation, if continued, will force the government to decide between volume and revenue. Pegged to the US$, Saudi crude, priced in US$ will become more expensive for the Chinese. It will reduce demand for Saudi crude and/or make the crude of other exporters—e.g. the Russians—whose currencies float. Yet reducing the US$ price to support volumes to China will reduce crude export revenues, which, if sufficiently substantial, could undermine confidence in the Saudi economy and therefore the Riyal peg to the US$.

– For the Russians, the Chinese Central Bank announcement possibly produced excitement at the prospect of competitive advantage over the Saudis in pricing. Quickly, however, excitement may have turned into anxiety. Neither side has made public critical details—including the currency or currencies in which sales will be settled and priced—of three bilateral energy megadeals: Rosneft’s $270 billion 2013 agreement to supply 300,000 mbbl/day annually to China for 25 years; the $400 billion, 30 year agreement signed in 2014 to supply natural gas to China from Eastern Siberia; and the negotiations underway to supply natural gas from Western Siberia.

Are prices set in US$, Rubles, Yuan, a basket of currencies (US$, Euro, Swiss Franc)? Are the Chinese expected to pay in Yuan at the Yuan/Ruble exchange rate? In Rubles at the Ruble/Yuan exchange rate? In Yuan at the Yuan/US$ exchange rate? Each alternative has different implications for Rosneft’s and Gazprom’s gross and net revenues from the sale of crude (Rosneft) and natural gas (Gazprom).

And the Winner is…

Despite the intense pain they are suffering in the low price Crudedome, both the Russian and Saudi governments profess for public consumption that they are committed to their volume and market share policies.

This observer believes the two countries cannot long withstand the pain they have brought upon themselves—and this article only scratches the surface of the negative impact of low crude prices on their economies. They have, in effect, turned no pain no gain into intense pain no gain and set in motion the possibility neither will exit the low price Crudedome under its own power.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Market-Showdown-Can-Russia-Outlast-The-Saudis.html

By Dalan McEndree for Oilprice.com

10/14/15

China To Continue Expanding Its Influence In The Oil And Gas Sector

Since 2009, China has been taking a much more active role in its pursuit of international oil contracts. In 2009, for the first time, Saudi Arabia exported more of its oil to China than it did to the U.S. China also made large investments in Saudi Arabia’s oil refining industry as well. But China’s oil investments didn’t stop there; they also pursued oil producing Canadian assets in 2011-12.

When it comes to Chinese energy industry, there are three major state owned companies. One is called China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), which is an oil and gas producer, another is called PetroChina, which is another oil producing company, and its third company is Sinopec, which is primarily a refining company.

Lately though, China’s large investments are being made in the mid-stream sector of the oil and gas industry, the one sector China doesn’t have a national company for. This is the part of the industry that transports oil and gas from producing wells to the refineries, so oil can be turned into liquid fuel.

One of China’s most recent mid-stream deals included building a pipeline from Iran to Pakistan, which is being built despite objections from the U.S. The stated reason though, isn’t to satisfy China’s energy consumption, but to help alleviate Pakistan from its current energy problems.

China’s other recent mid-stream pipeline deal was made with Russia. Unlike the pipeline that will travel from Iran to Pakistan, this pipeline deal was made as a means to satisfy China’s growing thirst for oil. The pipeline will transport crude oil from Russia to Daqing, China.

This may be why China is now on the verge of creating a new mid-stream pipeline company. The state backed China Securities Journal stated that, the government of China will start stripping away pipeline assets from its three largest firms mentioned above, and then they will sell those assets to private investors. The journal states that this move is aimed at reducing the monopoly its state owned enterprises have enjoyed since their creation. It also said that the move will create more competition within the energy sector, and hopefully reduce the corruption that has been brewing in the Chinese energy industry.

While this sounds legitimate on the surface, there are reasons to believe that these actions will have very little effect.

And that is largely because China is only selling mid-stream assets. These state owned enterprises will still have monopolies on its upstream and downstream assets. And the new company emerging will have a new monopoly on the mid-stream sector of China’s oil and gas industry. Instead of competition, it is more likely that this creation of a new mid-stream company will be used as a way for the Chinese government to help monitor and control its transportation and flow of energy.

If China was really concerned about corruption in the oil and energy sector, stemming from the oligopoly that these state-owned enterprises enjoyed, then they would take away all of their assets, and then sell them to the private investors and entrepreneurs. They wouldn’t create a new mid-stream company, which will basically have its own monopoly in the mid-stream sector.

Nevertheless, what we do know is that China will be a major energy player for the foreseeable future. On a demand basis, its crude consumption has increased by 10 percent on a year over year basis (YOY). This summer alone, China has already made two new pipeline deals with three different countries. And China is also actively filling up its strategic petroleum reserves (SPR).

Given China’s large and growing energy sector, there is a degree of logic in the government creating a new mid-stream company, allowing the state to monitor energy flows. But in terms of its stated reason for creating a new mid-stream company in order to reduce corruption, I just don’t buy it.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/China-To-Continue-Expanding-Its-Influence-In-The-Oil-And-Gas-Sector.html

By John Manfreda for Oilprice.com

10/6/15

Is Russia Plotting To Bring Down OPEC?

President Putin’s recent moves in the Middle East—to shore up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria through deployment of combat aircraft, equipment, and manpower and build-out of air-, naval-, and ground-force bases, and the agreement in the last week with Iran, Iraq, and Syria on intelligence and security cooperation—could contribute to Russian efforts to combat the myriad negative pressures on Russia’s vital energy industry.

Live by Energy…

Energy is the foundation of Russia, its economy, its government, and its political system. Putin has highlighted on various occasions the contribution Russia’s mineral wealth, in particular oil and natural gas, must make for Russia to be able to sustain economic growth, promote industrial development, catch up with the developed economies, and modernize Russia’s military and military industry.

Even a casual glance at the IMF’s World Economic Outlook statistics for Russia shows the tight correlation since 1992 between GDP growth on the one hand and oil and gas output, exports, and prices on the other (economic series available here). According to the IMF’s 2015 Article Iv Consultation-Press Release and Staff Report, published August 3, oil and natural gas exports comprised 65 percent of exports, 52 percent of the Federal government budget, and 14.5 percent of GDP in 2014. Including their domestic contribution, hydrocarbons represent ~30 percent of GDP.

While oil and natural gas are crucial to Russia, Russia’s crude and natural gas are crucial to its neighbors on the Eurasian landmass. Russia supplied about 30 percent (146.6 bcm) of Europe’s natural gas in 2014, and about 25 percent of its crude (3.5 mmbbl/day) in 2013. Russia’s oil and natural gas are also important to its Asian and Central Asian neighbors.

It is not only the commodities that make Russia crucial, but its massive land-based infrastructure for their distribution throughout the Eurasian landmass. As Tatiana Mitrova, head of the oil and gas department, Energy Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, pointed out regarding natural gas in The Geopolitics of Russian Natural Gas:

“Russia has a unique transcontinental infrastructure in the heart of Eurasia (150,000 km of trunk pipelines), which also makes it a backbone of the evolving, huge Eurasian gas market (which could include Europe, North Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Caspian Sea region, and Northeast Asia). Control over the transportation assets in this region together with vast gas reserves make Russia the key element of this new market.”

The land-based oil distribution network is smaller, but also important. The 4,000 km Druzhba pipeline delivers about 1 mmbbl/day of crude to Europe—about 30 percent of total shipments to Europe. In the Far East, Rosneft shipped 22.6 million tons of crude to China in 2014 through the East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline.

The Russian government continues to seek to extend and expand the natural gas distribution infrastructure—into Europe, with various proposed pipeline projects (Nord Stream 2, Turkish Stream 2, 3, and 4, South European Pipeline), and into China, with two large pipeline projects, Power of Siberia Pipeline (to supply China from East Siberia), and the proposed Altai pipeline (to supply China from West Siberia).

…Death by Energy

In the last few years, the threats to Russia’s energy industry have multiplied and intensified. They pose an existential threat to the industry and therefore to the Russian economy:

– The revenues Russia can earn from its crude and natural gas exports face intense pressure. The Saudi decision to let the market set prices and to pursue market share, has led to steep declines in crude and petroleum product prices. The decision also has impacted natural gas export prices negatively, since, for Russia’s long-term supply agreements, they wholly or partially are indexed to oil prices. The transition in Europe to hybrid natural gas pricing models (which take European spot hub prices into account) also has pressured natural gas pricing. (Natural gas data from Gazprom).

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Adding to the revenue pain, natural gas export volumes have been falling, according to Gazprom (which has a monopoly on pipeline exports), as have domestic volumes within Russia:

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It is therefore not surprising that the aforementioned IMF Article Iv Consultation-Press Release and Staff Report projected sharp declines in 2015 and 2016 from 2014 levels for oil export revenues ($109.8 billion and $96 billion respectively) and natural gas export revenues ($12 billion and $14.3 billion respectively).

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Since these IMF projections are based on $60.1 and $65.8 per barrel prices in 2015 and 2016, oil export revenues will undershoot these pessimistic IMF projections, as crude prices are projected to stay below $60 through 2016 (EIA estimates for Brent are $54.07 and 58.57 in 2015 and 2016 respectively).

– The U.S. and European Union’s decisions to impose—and maintain—sanctions on Russia after its invasion and annexation of Crimea and invasion and informal annexation eastern Ukraine will pile more pressure on the Russian energy industry. They include bans on financing for and the supply of critical equipment and technology to important Russian energy projects. Novatek and its partners Total and Chinese National Petroleum Company still lack $15 billion of the $27 billion needed to finance the Yamal LNG plant. Denis Khramov, Russia’s deputy Minister of Natural Resources, said September 28 at a conference in Russia’s Far East that Rosneft and Gazprom are delaying some offshore drilling by two to three years because of sanctions and low oil prices. The sanctions are also impeding Gazprom’s ability to develop the Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye fields in eastern Siberia, from which it plans to supply natural gas to China under the bilateral $400 billion, thirty year deal signed in 2014.

– Following the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, The European Union is now even more determined to reduce its dependence on Russia for natural gas and to force Gazprom submit to EU competition rules. Europe has sought and continues to seek alternatives Russian natural gas (among them, U.S. LNG and Iranian pipeline and/or LNG). The European Commission, the European Union’s executive body, has refused to bless Gazprom’s proposed 55 bcm/year Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project, citing existing surplus Gazprom pipeline capacity into Europe and insufficient future demand for Russian natural gas. Also, the EU Commission in April charged Gazprom with violating the EU’s anti-trust laws for anti-competitive practices and unfair pricing in Central and Eastern Europe. If found guilty, Gazprom could face substantial fines of around $1 billion. Even if Gazprom avoids fines and manages to reach a settlement with the EU, as it hopes to do, its European market share and pricing will remain under pressure into the future.

– The emergence of the U.S., along with Canada, as powerful crude, NGL, and natural gas producers is also a major concern for the Russian economy. This has transformed the U.S. from a market for Russian crude and natural gas (via LNG) to a global competitor. If, as seems increasingly likely, the ban on crude exports is lifted, U.S. crude will compete with Russian crude in several key markets. It would also force foreign suppliers to seek other markets for all or part of the exports they previously sent to the U.S. This in turn would intensify competition among these crude exporting countries for share in those markets. In regard to natural gas, its explosive output growth in the U.S. undercut Gazprom’s rationale for its Baltic LNG project (10 mtpa), turned the U.S. into a major (potential) LNG competitor in global LNG import markets, and, via the U.S. toll- and Henry Hub- pricing model, weakened Gazprom’s ability to insist on oil-indexed, long-term contracts.

Saving Russian Energy (and Russia) through the Middle East?

Putin’s moves in the Middle East could help Russia address the impact of these threats to the Russian energy industry. They potentially enhance the attractiveness of Russian crude and natural gas supplies compared to those from Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies.

In the selection of crude and natural gas suppliers, security is a key consideration for importers. Wary of U.S. naval power, the Chinese, for example, prefer pipeline natural gas supplies over seaborne LNG supplies. Importers therefore must take into consideration the potential threats to transport. In this critical area, Russia enjoys a decided advantage over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab producers, which depend on sea transport through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to ship their oil and LNG.

Each of the three routes from these two bodies of water passes through a “choke point” (from the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal to Europe and through the Mandeb Strait to Asia, from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz). By adding an airbase to their military presence in Syria, the Russians—coordinating with Iran, Syrian President Assad, and eventually possibly Iraq—would have the capability to disrupt shipments from Persian Gulf and Red Sea terminals.

Russia’s export channels are less susceptible to disruption. With the exception of LNG exports to Asia from Sakhalin, Russia sends natural gas to its customers via pipeline. About 70 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports are susceptible to choke points (shipments from two ports on the Gulf of Finland through the Baltic Sea to the Atlantic and one port on the Black Sea through the Turkish Strait/Bosporus to the Mediterranean), while 30 percent are not (pipeline shipments to Europe and ESPO pipeline shipments to the port of Primorsk near Vladivostok).

Putin’s moves also are strengthening Russia’s influence with OPEC. Russia already has extensive and close ties with Iran and Venezuela, and is now laying the basis for such ties with Iraq. Putin has aligned Russia with OPEC’s have nots–the members lacking financial resources to withstand low crude prices for an extended period and that have objected to Saudi policies (Iran, Iraq, Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Ecuador, and Venezuela)—against the haves (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar). He has continually supported Venezuelan President Maduro’s calls for an emergency OPEC meeting on prices and his efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to reverse its policy. Most recently, in the beginning of September, Putin told Maduro that the two countries “must team up to shore up oil prices”.

In addition, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of energy policy, Arkady Dvorkovich, in the beginning of September made comments that, in tone and substance, mocked Saudi policy, saying that “OPEC producers are suffering the ricochet effects of their attempt to flush out rivals by flooding the world with excess output,” expressing doubt that OPEC members “really want to live with low oil prices for a long time,” and implying that Saudi policy is irrational.

Indeed, Russia can be seen as maneuvering to split OPEC into two blocs, with Russia, although not a member, persuading the “Russian bloc” to isolate Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab OPEC members within OPEC. This might persuade the Saudis to seek a compromise with the have nots.

A strategic alliance with Iran and Iraq offers Putin two more potential avenues to pressure the Saudis. They can test Saudi determination to defend their market share at any price and its wherewithal financially to do so. Iran claims it can raise crude output by one million barrels within six or so months of the lifting of sanctions. The Saudis may be calculating that Iran must first rehabilitate its oil fields and that Iran, cash poor, cannot do so quickly. If this is the case, Russia could step in, offer Iran financing, and force the Saudis to contemplate prices staying lower longer than they anticipated and therefore continuing pressure on their economy.

Russia also could cooperate with Iran and Iraq to take market share from Saudi Arabia in the vital Chinese market. As a recent Bloomberg article pointed out, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Iraq and other countries are vying intensely for sales to China, the second largest import market and the major source of demand growth in coming years. Coordinating their pricing and consistently offering the Chinese prices below the Saudi price, they could seek to win market share. Such a price war would pressure the competitors’ currencies.

Since the Russians allow the Ruble to float, Iran maintains an informal and unofficial peg for its Rial to the US$, and Iraq has indicated it is willing to adjust its peg if necessary, while the Saudis are committed to the Riyal’s peg to the US$, Russia, Iran, and Iraq would have any advantage over Saudi Arabia. To the extent that Iran and Iraq allowed their currencies to adjust, Russian, Iranian, and Iraqi revenues in local currency terms would not decline as much as Saudi revenues fixed in US$ (and might even increase) as their currencies depreciated.

Results

Each of these opportunities offers the possibility to address the pressures on the Russian energy industry. However, Putin will have to play his cards carefully. Played heavy-handedly, he could intensify fears in Europe of excessive dependence on Russian energy supplies and awaken such fears in China. This could lead the Europeans and Chinese to search for other suppliers. In addition, mismanaged confrontation with the U.S. and Europe in and over Syria could lead to broadening and strengthening of economic and financial sanctions. Moreover, neither Iran nor Iraq will want to become overly dependent on Russia, which lacks the resources they need develop their energy industries.

Finally, the opportunities assume Putin’s gambits in Syria and with Syria, Iran, and Iraq in intelligence and security cooperation will succeed. And this, given the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and Putin’s experience in eastern Ukraine, is far from certain.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-Russia-Plotting-To-Bring-Down-OPEC.html

By Dalan McEndree for Oilprice.com

08/26/15

Saudis Could Face An Open Revolt At Next OPEC Meeting

OPEC next gathers December 4 in Vienna, just over a year since Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi announced at the previous OPEC winter meeting the Saudi decision to let the oil market determine oil prices rather than to continue Saudi Arabia’s role of guarantor of $100+/bbl oil.

Despite the intense financial and economic pain this decision has inflicted on Saudi Arabia, its fellow OPEC members, and other oil producers, the Saudis have given no indication they plan to alter course. In fact, Saudis have downplayed the impact of lower prices on their country, asserting that the kingdom has the financial wherewithal to withstand lower oil prices.

Presumably swayed by Saudi equanimity, financial markets do not see the Saudis abandoning their current policy before, during, or after the upcoming OPEC meeting. CME Brent oil futures project continuity: as of August 18, 2015, CME Brent futures projected the price remaining below $60/bbl until June 2017. A CNBC poll of oil traders, analysts, and major fund investors, aired on CNBC August 17, showed 95 percent believing the Saudis will not alter course.

Are the futures market, CNBC’s oil traders, analysts, and major fund investors, and others, being lulled into an unjustified consensus?

The damage the Saudi decision has inflicted on Saudi Arabia itself provides reasons for the Saudis to change course.

Saudi Policy: OPEC-centric or Self-Serving?

Stresses within OPEC should add to the pressure on the Saudis to rethink their strategy. The Saudis sold their change to their fellow OPEC members as being in OPEC’s general interest. They asserted that the their traditional method of stabilizing the oil market, production cuts, would not work since non-OPEC producers would increase output; second, that “market” forces would reduce investment and therefore increase prices in the medium and longer term and ultimately benefit all OPEC members; and third, that any Saudi increase in output was aimed at defending its market share, not reducing theirs.

As the first anniversary of the Saudi decision approaches, it would be reasonable for OPEC outsiders–OPEC members, other than the Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar—to interpret Saudi policy shift as designed to serve Saudi interests and those of its Gulf Arab allies rather than their interests and those of OPEC in general.

“Market” forces include many components. A key component—perhaps the key component—is a country’s capability, at a minimum, to maintain output, and better yet, to increase output. Financial wherewithal is the foundation of this component. Saudi and Gulf Arab OPEC members’ foreign currency reserves and sovereign wealth funds (SWF) comprise approximately 78 percent of total OPEC member holdings, $2.73 trillion of $3.05 trillion.

As the following table shows, their advantage is particularly large on a per capita basis. Of the non-Saudi, non-Gulf Arab ally OPEC members, only Libyan per capita resources exceed the average. (The UAE includes data for three SWF funds only: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ($773 billion), Abu Dhabi Investment Council ($110 billion), and Investment Corporation of Dubai ($183 billion)).

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Given the other budgetary demands on their oil revenues, $50/bbl or $60/bbl oil leaves these OPEC outsiders with little to invest in maintaining oil output, much less expanding output. Budgetary pressures and limited financial resources, for example, have forced the Iraqi government to request its foreign partners, BP in the Rumaila field and Exxon in the West Gurna-1 field, to reduce spending to cut 2015 investment by $500 million ($1.1 billion vs. $1.6 billion) and $1 billion ($2.5 billion to $3.5) respectively.

While all OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia, have suffered from the Saudi decision, they have not shared the pain equally. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies, except Qatar, have increased output, while the output of other OPEC members, other than Iraq and Angola, has either flat-lined or decreased, compared to 2014:

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Given Saudi determination to defend its export markets, it is interesting that the percentage gain in their crude exports exceeded the percentage gain in crude output in 1H 2015, by 2.7 percentage points. For Iran, the only other OPEC country for which the IEA provides domestic demand data, the increase in exports, 0.7 percent, matched the increased domestic output.

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Interestingly, also, the Saudis increased their share of OPEC average daily output in the first half of 2015 over 2014 average daily volume—and their share of average daily global output. Their share of OPEC output increased to 26.6 percent in 1H 2015, from 26 percent on average in 2014, while their share of world output increased to 10.4 percent from 10.2 percent.

For the OPEC outsiders, this should be particularly distressing, since the increase in output likely deepened the decline in prices the Saudi decision to abandon its role as guarantor precipitated.

Both results continue trends seen since 2010. Saudi share of OPEC output increased three percentage points, from 23.6 percent in 2010 to 26.6 percent in 1H 2015. At the same time, the Saudi share of world output increased 1.1 percentage points, from 9.3 percent to 10.4 percent, during the same period; during the same period, OPEC output as a share of global output declined slightly, from 39.5 percent to 39.2 percent.

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In fact, over this period, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies increased their total output 18.1 percent while the output from the other OPEC members decreased 5.4 percent. During this period, the Saudi and Gulf Arab share of global output was flat, declining only 0.1 percentage point, while the share of the other members declined 1.5 percentage points, from 16.7 percent to 15.2 percent.

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Impact on Non-OPEC Producers as Advertised?

In defense of their policy, the Saudis could point to IEA projections that show the rate of growth in output from major non-OPEC producers slowing substantially in 2016, particularly in North America, a major Saudi target, and Brazil:

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However, it is reasonable for the OPEC outsiders to question the actual efficacy of Saudi policy on non-OPEC producers and the benefit it will bring them. In both the United States and Russia, each of which produces roughly as much as Saudi Arabia, output increased in 2015 rather than decreasing, and will continue to increase in 2016 in the U.S.

The IEA projects Brazil’s output, despite Brazilian political turmoil, growing 6.45 percent in 2016. Moreover, Saudi policy, combined with the impact of U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia, led to the undesirable result for OPEC (and other oil exporters) that Russian exports have increased, from 7.21 million barrels/day in 2014 to 7.55 million barrels per day in 1H 2015, in part because as Russia’s economy contracted, reducing domestic crude demand to 3.47 MMbbls/day in 1H 2015 from 3.65 MMbbls/day, while crude output increased to 11.025 MMbbls/day from 10.86 MMbbls/day.

Moreover, any comfort the OPEC outsiders gain at best may be cold comfort. While the IEA projects surplus production will begin to recede in 2H 2016, they are suffering now (and in any case, it is a projection). As we have pointed out, RBC Capital’s fragile five, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Iraq and Venezuela, the pain is intense. Also, it is wealthy Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies and non-OPEC members, in particular the U.S., Canada, Mexico (foreign investment), and also Russia (Chinese investment), that will have the financial wherewithal to grow output to satisfy the 18 million barrel per day increase in demand that OPEC sees by 2040.

The December 2015 OPEC Meeting

Given the Saudi decision’s positive impact on their and their Gulf Arab allies’ relative position within OPEC and its negative impact on OPEC outsiders, it is possible, perhaps even likely, the Saudis will face an OPEC outsider revolt at the December 4 OPEC meeting.

The Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies would seem to have three possible approaches, should a revolt occur:

Reconciliation, as Saudi Arabia acquiesces in the wishes of OPEC’s weaker members to bring price increases forward through OPEC production cuts, Saudi Arabia bearing the brunt;

Separation, as the Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies ignore their fellow members’ entreaties and force them to wait for “market” forces to balance supply and demand; or

Divorce, as the Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies decide to exploit their financial wealth and go their own way, therefore forcing their fellow OPEC members, unable to finance their domestic oil industries, unwillingly to bear the brunt of global production cuts.

In October 2014, the Saudis began signaling their intention to abandon their role as guarantor. It is unlikely however, that whatever Saudi decision makers are now considering, they will show their hand in advance of the December meeting, since this would reduce pressure on the non-OPEC producers that the Saudis claim to be targeting, before necessary.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Saudis-Could-Face-An-Open-Revolt-At-Next-OPEC-Meeting.html

By Dalan McEndree for Oilprice.com

08/8/15

Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt: EPA Rule A Political Power Grab Over Power Grid

07/14/15

OPEC, Get Ready For The Second U.S. Oil Boom

What OPEC countries fear most is a follow-up technological revolution that will lead to a second oil boom in the U.S., and that fear is now being realized.

A technological revolution spurred the U.S. oil boom that resulted in the greatest increase in domestic oil production in a century, and while that has stuttered in the face of a major oil price slump and an OPEC campaign to maintain a grip on market share, the American response could be another technological revolution that demonstrates that the first one was merely an impressive embryonic experiment.

It’s not only about shale now—it’s about reviving mature oil fields through advancements in enhanced oil recovery, potentially opening up not only new shale fields, but older fields that have been forgotten.

There are myriad gloom-and-doom stories about what is often alluded to as a short-lived oil boom in the U.S. But what many fail to understand is that revolutions of this nature are phased, with the advent of new technology typically followed by a temporary halt in progress while we study the results and come up with something even better.

What we’re looking at here are advancements in EOR for greater production and cost efficiency that can weather oil price slumps and awaken America’s sleeping giant oil fields. Soon we are likely to see some new players in the field buying up oil assets and putting more advanced EOR technologies to work to re-ignite the revolution.

The shale revolution was stunning, indeed. But there have been setbacks—even beyond the oil price slump that has rendered fracking expensive. Fracking uses a lot of water. According to a recent U.S. Geological Survey study, the process uses up to 9.6 million gallons of water per well and is putting farming and drinking sources at risk in arid states, and especially in major drought-ridden shale-boom venues like Texas.

Phase two of the U.S. oil boom hits at the heart of the inadequacies of the first phase, in a natural progression.

There are two very interesting EOR advancements that have caught our attention in recent months: CO2 EOR and Plasma Pulse Technology (PPT).

CO2, or carbon dioxide EOR, involves injecting CO2 into ageing oil fields to sweep residual oil to the surface. In some cases, it can extend the production life of a field by more than 25 years. The U.S. is fortunate in this regard because it has a large volume of low-cost, naturally occurring CO2 at its disposal; however, in order to be widely employed the infrastructure to deliver it to oil fields has to be in place.

Visiongain estimates that global CO2 EOR spending will be $4.74 billion this year. “This will decline in the short term as low oil prices take their toll on the capital spending programmes of CO2 EOR operators, but is expected to rise rapidly in the next decade.”

Then we have something a bit more futuristic, even though it is already commercially viable—Plasma Pulse Technology, or PPT. This is a patent pending technology that enables the “re-opening” of wells without water, without polluting chemicals and without causing earthquakes. The “re-opening” side of this equation means that it doesn’t open rock like fracking, rather it comes in afterwards and cleans up well bores to clear the pathway for oil to flow faster and more efficiently to the surface like it once did.

Plasma Pulse Technology (PPT) creates a controlled plasma arc within a vertical well, generating a tremendous amount of heat for a fraction of a second, while the subsequent high-speed hydraulic impulse wave emitted is strong enough to remove any clogged sedimentation from the perforation zone without damaging the steel casing. The series of impulse waves also penetrates deep into the reservoir, which re-opens reservoir permeability for up to a year per treatment.

But to determine what new EOR technology is going to steal the limelight in the coming months and years, we follow the progress of the EOR leaders and the big strategic investors, such as Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich.

The market leader in extracting oil and gas using CO2 enhanced oil recovery processes is Denbury Resources (NYSE:DNR), which many will agree is a company that offers investors long-term value because of its focus on efficiency.

As for Abramovich, he is a metals magnate who also happens to own the Chelsea football club and is the 143rd wealthiest person in the world, worth about $9 billion according to Forbes. He is the main owner of UK-registered Millhouse LLC, a private investment company whose assets have included major stakes in Sibneft, which is now Gazprom Neft. In 2005, Millhouse sold a 72 percent stake in Sibneft to Gazprom for more than $13 billion.

In fact, PPT first caught our eye back in February, when Abramovich—who has a track record of very strategic investments–moved to invest $15 million in a Houston-based company called Propell Technologies Group, Inc. (OTC:PROP). Until Abramovich brought it to the world’s attention, few had probably ever heard of Propell, which has a wholly-owned subsidiary called Novas Energy U.S.A, the licensee and developer of the PPT technology.

The subsidiary licenses the technology from a venture capital-backed Russian energy technology company named Novas Energy, and the Russian connection makes sense here. After all, Plasma Pulse technology has been very successfully employed in both Russian producer and injector wells. More than anything, this Russian connection speaks volumes about the efficiency of this advanced EOR technology: Russia doesn’t have draconian fracking regulations pressuring companies to use environmentally friendly technology. What this means is that it’s cost effective; otherwise Russians wouldn’t be using it.

Beyond the technology itself, if we follow Abramovich further we get a glimpse of what’s about to happen on the U.S. EOR scene. In February, Abramovich took a stake with Propell, which was made through a Cyprus-registered company called Ervington Investments Limited. The February deal saw Propell raise $5 million from the sale of 1,525,424 shares of a preferred stock at $3.28 per share. The deal also gave Ervington the option to invest an additional $9.75 million, under the same terms, which it took advantage of on July 6. This Abramovich investment will be used to acquire oilfields with the overall aim to employ the new technology to increase output.

You have to read between the lines here. Abramovich doesn’t do anything small. He’ll get the infrastructure in place and then look to acquire a significant position in the U.S. oil sector at today’s fire sale prices to employ this EOR technology.

If OPEC keeps oil prices below $100 for some time to come, the smart investor will be looking for something that captures long-term value, which means focusing on operational efficiency.

So while many might assume that EOR is now too expensive to be supported during an oil price slump, a little counter-intuition tells us that this will change in the immediate future and investors will start looking at companies who are actually behind this new technology or the companies who are focusing on using this new technology–whether it be CO2 EOR or PPT–to get more out of their oilfields.

Over the long-term EOR makes production cheaper. And as Chesapeake Energy’s (NYSE:CHK) Jason Pigott succinctly put it: “We can’t control prices, so we have to focus on how much it costs to get it out of the ground.”

When low oil prices close doors, technology steps in to reopen them, and certainly innovation will drive the next U.S. oil boom—and the latest advancements are already commercially viable. The door has been re-opened.

What OPEC knows is this: The U.S. has over 21 billion barrels of oil that could be economically recovered with today’s EOR technologies. And according to figures from the U.S. Department of Energy and the Western Governors Association (WGA), further advances in this technology could cause that figure to double.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/OPEC-Get-Ready-For-The-Second-US-Oil-Boom.html

07/9/15

Nuclear Weapons Testing in Nevada, It is Getting Real

By: Denise Simon
FoundersCode.com

VIENNA—Tensions in the nuclear talks between Iran and six powers have boiled over in recent days, producing heated exchanges among foreign ministers as Washington and Tehran struggled to overcome remaining hurdles to a final agreement, according to people involved in the talks.

The German and British foreign ministers returned to the Austrian capital Wednesday evening as Western diplomats insisted a deal was still possible in coming days. However, time was running out for the agreement to be sealed before a deadline this week which would give the U.S. Congress an extra month to review a deadline.

People close to the talks have warned that the longer Congress and opponents of the diplomacy get to pick over an agreement and galvanize opposition, the greater the political risks for supporters of the process, which aims to block Iran’s path to nuclear weapons in exchange for lifting tight international sanctions.

U.S. officials have insisted this week they don’t feel under pressure to get a deal by the congressional deadline, which arrives at midnight Thursday (6 a.m. Friday in Vienna.)

Over the past day, Western officials and Iranian media have outlined tense exchanges between the negotiating teams that took place Monday evening, at a point where the talks appeared close to stalling. At the time, negotiators were working toward a Tuesday deadline for a deal.

Today, Barack Obama had a teleconference with John Kerry on the progress of the Iran nuclear weapons talks and even provided guidance as noted below. Israel has been kept completely in the dark on the talks.

Later today, the U.S. Air Force Secretary had this to say:

Russia is the biggest threat to US national security and America must boost its military presence throughout Europe even as NATO allies face budget challenges and scale back spending, US Air Force Secretary Deborah James said on Wednesday.

“I do consider Russia to be the biggest threat,” James told Reuters in an interview after a series of visits and meetings with US allies across Europe, including Poland.

James said Washington was responding to Russia’s recent “worrisome” actions by boosting its presence across Europe, and would continue rotational assignments of F-16 fighter squadrons. Deeper details are here.

There is an oil and real estate coupd’etat.

China is conducting Arctic research in an area considered the extended undersea shelf of the United States, while Russia is able to move across the frozen regions in 27 icebreakers.

Meanwhile, Adm. Paul F. Zukunft, commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, said the United States is practically a bystander in the region.

“We sit here on the sidelines as the only nation that has not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention,” Zukunft told a gathering Tuesday at the Navy League’s annual Sea Air Space exposition and conference at National Harbor, Maryland. “Our nation has two ocean-going icebreakers … We’re the most prosperous nation on Earth. Our GDP is eight times that of Russia. Russia has 27 ocean-going icebreakers.”

The U.S. has only two, he said, practically conceding the Arctic to foreign nations, Zukunft said.

“What happened when Sputnik went up? Did we say ‘good for you but we’re not playing in that game?’” he asked. “Well, we’re not playing in this game at all.”

Beneath the Arctic is about 13 percent of the world’s oil and nearly 30 percent of its natural gas. And on the seabed is about a trillion dollars’ worth of minerals, Zukunft said. Coast Guard mapping indicates that an area about twice the size of California would be considered America’s extended continental under the U.N. sea convention not signed by the U.S.

Meanwhile, it is getting real in Nevada….

Air force drops nuclear bomb in Nevada in first controversial test to update cold war arsenal

‘This test marks a major milestone for the B61-12 Life Extension Program, demonstrating end-to-end system performance under representative delivery conditions,’ said NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Dr. Don Cook.

‘Achieving the first complete B61-12 flight test provides clear evidence of the nation’s continued commitment to maintain the B61 and provides assurance to our allies.’

The B61, known before 1968 as the TX-61, was designed in 1963 by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

The B61-12 LEP entered Development Engineering in February 2012 after approval from the Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy/NNSA organization established to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two departments as they fulfill their complementary agency responsibilities for U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile management. More details here.

07/7/15

Is Saudi Arabia Leaving The U.S. Behind For Russia?

The news from the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum, which took place from June 18 to 20, inspired a torrent of speculation on the future direction of energy prices.

But the real buzz at the conference was the unexpected but much publicized visit of the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince, as an emissary of the King. The Prince, who is also his country’s Defense Minister, carried the royal message of a direct invitation to President Putin to visit the King, which was immediately accepted and reciprocated, with the Prince accepting on behalf of his father.

It would be news enough that the unusually high level delegation from a long-time ally and protectorate of the U.S., like Saudi Arabia, was visiting a Russian sponsored economic conference, in a country sanctioned by the U.S.

Some saw this well publicized meeting as the first sign of an emerging partnership between the two greatest global oil producers. If the warmth of the meeting was any evidence, it seems likely that Russia, a non-OPEC producer, might come a lot closer to the fold.

That could mean that, at the very least, Russia would have a voice in the cartel’s policy decisions on production. And if so, it would be a voice on the side of stable but rising prices.

The great Indian journalist, M.K. Bhadrakumar (MKB), may have been the first to point out that there was plenty of reasons for the Saudis and Russians to come closer together. Among these are the U.S.’ diminishing dependence on Middle Eastern energy, due to the momentous development of shale resources. There’s also the over-riding goal of the U.S. to pivot toward the East, where a huge economic transformation is unfolding, while reducing the U.S. role in the Middle East. It’s clear that the Saudis are going to have to make new friends.

MKB also makes the point that although the Saudis are wildly opposed to any form of U.S. entente with Iran, the clear-eyed Kremlin understands that there are many temptations for its erstwhile ally, Iran, to move much closer to the West.

Pepe Escobar of Asia Times saw the Prince’s visit as harboring the first glimmer of light in ending the current global oil trade war, in which the Saudi’s might turn down the spigot and lower production, enabling prices to rise: “Facts on the ground included Russia and Saudi Arabia’s oil ministers discussing a broad cooperation agreement; the signing of six nuclear technology agreements; and the Supreme Imponderable; Putin and the deputy crown prince discussing oil prices. Could this be the end of the Saudi-led oil price war?”

Bullish oil traders thought they found some hope in the words of Ali al-Naimi, the famous and longtime President and CEO of the Saudi National Oil Company, Aramco, and current oil minister. Naimi publicly stated: “I am optimistic about the future of the market in the coming months in terms of the continuing improvement and increasing global demand for oil as well as the low level of commercial inventories.” This, the minister said, should lead to higher oil prices by year’s end.

Ali al-Naimi publicly praised the enhanced bilateral cooperation between Riyadh and Moscow, stating that, “[t]his, in turn, will lead to creating a petroleum alliance between the two countries for the benefit of the international oil market…”

This could be music to the ears of oil price bulls. But more skeptical minds were quick to clamp down excessive optimism. “Of course, we shouldn’t read into any new developments outside political frameworks, because I can hardly imagine that Saudi Arabia has decided to turn against its alliances—but it probably wants to get out of the narrow US corner and expand its options,” Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, the General Manager of Al Arabiya News Channel, wrote in a column after the summit.

At the meeting, the Saudis and Russians signed several memoranda of understanding including the development of nuclear power plants in the Kingdom, with the Saudis planning some 16+ plants.

The two sides also plan on setting up working groups to study other possible energy joint ventures in Russia. Russia also agreed to the construction of railways and metro subways for the Saudis. Russia is also believed to have agreed to supply advanced military defense equipment to the Kingdom, despite the Saudis being long time arms customers of both the UK and U.S.

However there is quite a bit of doubt that the U.S. is ready to just step aside and be replaced by Russia as the Saudis’ main ally. Saudi Arabia and Russia are on opposite sides on a range of geopolitical issues, including Iran, Syria, and Yemen. These conflicts will likely put a limit on any potential entente.

Also, there is serious doubt as to whether it is so simple for the Saudis to raise oil prices. Flooding the markets with oil to crash prices only requires the Saudis to over-produce by some one and a half million barrels of oil per day, easily within their grasp, and something the Saudis can do on their own.

Bringing prices up is a different story, requiring global oil producers to comply in oil cutbacks.

At the same time, rising prices are a clear signal to global producers to increase production, worsening the current glut, so that any price increase may prove to be temporary.

And yet, the fact is prices have been rising since the first of the year, and many are convinced there is more to go. C. DeHaemmer, a well-known energy newsletter writer, is now predicting a price rise by WTI to a range of $73-$78, and a Brent range of $82-85, by years end. Not impossible, but long term, the issue becomes cloudier.

On a different matter, there was another surprise announcement at the forum, with India, a longtime U.S. ally, confirming that it will sign a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a Russian-led trade bloc including Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Russia and China have agreed on making the EEU a central part of the Chinese sponsored Silk Road, so by default, it would appear that India is moving towards joining the grand Chinese project.

As has become standard at the St. Petersburg Forum, a number of energy deals were signed, including a BP deal to buy a major stake in a Siberian oil field owned by Rosneft, a company suffering under international sanctions. BP, as a twenty percent stakeholder in Rosneft, says it is seeking to expand on its joint ventures with the Russian company

Another deal was signed with Gazprom to build a second pipeline under the Baltic, following the path of Nordstream to Germany, in partnership with Royal Dutch Shell, Germany’s E.ON, and Austria’s OMV. Apparently, Western Europe’s oil giants find Russian sanctions to be no hindrance in dealing with Russian energy companies.

After his onstage TV interview with Putin, Charlie Rose, the well-known TV celebrity, was asked why he had decided to become a moderator at the Forum. He said, “I believe it’s important to talk to people.”

In the meantime, the U.S. reporter, with camera man in tow, found nothing of interest to report at the conference.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Is-Saudi-Arabia-Leaving-The-US-Behind-For-Russia.html

By Robert Berke for Oilprice.com

06/24/15

Expect A Wave Of Consolidation In The Oil Industry

As stated previously, asset monetization by small E&P operators will start in earnest in the second half of this year out of cash flow necessity. Most, if not all, smaller market capitalization companies, public or private, are still free cash flow negative (operating cash flow less capital expenditure) and only a few of the larger ones are now, or will be, based on guidance. The point is, with volumes languishing (and probably poised to decline) tied to a flat oil futures price curve and with economics marginal at $60 per barrel, many E&P operators find themselves running through hedges in 2015 and still in need to finance their already reduced capital spending.

With Wall Street unwilling to lend anymore and prospects of fall credit line redeterminations looming, further reducing liquidity, it is likely small E&P operators will turn to either mature producing asset sales or, more likely, to undeveloped assets which require more capital spending. We are seeing this being factored into stock prices as we speak, as small cap E&P valuations have collapsed to 4-6 times the Enterprise Value/Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (EV/EBITDA) from 6-8X EV/EBITDA. This not only reflects solvency risk but also the natural course of bringing assets to a price more in line with their underlying sale value.

Wall Street is famous for getting public prices at levels that magically make deals happen and, with better funded E&P companies trading at substantial premiums vs. the leveraged ones, this is what is occurring. Take the collapse of Goodrich Petroleum (GDP) as a prime example as to what is now taking place and what will continue through the latter half of this year. Here is a company with $100million in liquidity but who continues to be free cash flow negative on current strip pricing in 2015 & 2016. However, it has a capital spending budget of $100 million for 2015 and 2016 and a free cash deficit of $60 million-$80 million in each of 2015 and 2016 depending on asset price assumptions. To plug the hole it hopes to sell its Eagle Ford assets this year.

This isn’t intended to make a case on GDP but to demonstrate the quantifiable ongoing stupidity of perpetuating models that aren’t self-funded which were being fueled by easy money from the Federal Reserve. This also demonstrates how the OPEC strategy of maintaining an oil price ceiling is affecting U.S. E&P companies, forcing a consolidation which I believe will be unprecedented in size and scope. This will eventually improve the industry cash flow break even points, based on improved cost and scale and, as a result, cast doubt over the long term viability of the OPEC strategy. It appears the Saudis, despite being educated here in the US, have neglected their capital market & economic classes as we are witnessing the E&P model self-correcting itself. State run oil companies don’t do this very well and usually fail to adjust to price movements while free market capital-based societies do.

The revival of the US oil industry will occur after the upcoming consolidation and will reduce the number of cost inefficient players as well as the short selling in group while ultimately, self-healing the industry by improving cash flows, given the likelihood of oil remaining below $100. I fully expect valuations to expand in 2016, once the wave of asset sales starts in the months ahead. These operators with plenty of cash will be the biggest beneficiaries.

On a final note, listening to the Federal Reserve yesterday it was clear that the pressure on the dollar rise is being lifted as they now realize that, despite attempts to fudge economic statistics, the US economy is in recession and rate hikes are a farce based on hope and little else. Expect the dollar to weaken considerably, breaching the 2015 lows thus supporting oil prices now and into 2016. This reality is not baked into expectations and the 1-2 percent dollar correction which took many by surprise is only the beginning.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Expect-A-Wave-Of-Consolidation-In-The-Oil-Industry.html

By Leonard Brecken of Oilprice.com